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When confronted with the question of why it is appropriate to morally blame a person for some bad 
action, it may seem plausible to reply that she is morally responsible for it. Some authors, inspired by 
Peter Strawson’s “Freedom and Resentment,” argue, however, that thinking this way is backwards. 
They believe that a person is morally responsible for some bad action because it would be appropri-
ate to blame her for it. The aims of this paper are to present this account, to highlight some of its 
important but often overlooked features, and to defend it against pressing objections.
line, argues for the thesis that a person s “is 
morally responsible (for action x) if and only 
if it would be appropriate to hold s morally 
responsible (for action x)” (Wallace 1994, p. 
91). In what follows, I will refer to this view 
as Weak Strawsonianism (for a view of this 
kind see, e.g., Watson 1996/2004; Fischer and 
Ravizza 1998; Darwall 2006; Schulte 2013).
 Weak Strawsonianism is weak in the 
sense that it is a thesis about necessarily co- 
occuring facts. It does not say that one side 
of the biconditional is more fundamental than 
the other. Inspired by Strawson, some authors 
seem to accept a stronger claim about meta-
physical fundamentality. Wallace is, once 
again, an important example. He argues that 
a person’s being morally responsible depends 
on and is fixed by the appropriateness of 
holding her responsible (see Wallace 1994, 
pp. 89, 91, 93). This is the central idea of 
what I will call Strong Strawsonianism. The 
aims of this paper are to highlight some of 
Strong Strawsonianism’s important but often 
overlooked features (section 2) and to defend 
it against important objections (sections 3–6).
1. Introduction
Suppose that you are responsible for a 
moral wrongdoing, say deliberately step-
ping on your neighbor’s foot. You know that 
stepping on her foot would hurt her, that she 
could legitimately demand that you not do it, 
and that doing it would be wrong. Even so, 
you deliberately and freely step on her foot. 
Other things being equal, it seems appropriate 
for your neighbor to blame you for stepping 
on her foot. The question I will discuss in this 
paper is this: What is it for us to be morally 
responsible for a morally questionable action 
such as your stepping on your neighbor’s foot?
 Inspired by Peter Strawson’s “Freedom and 
Resentment” (1962/2003), many authors be-
lieve that a person’s being morally responsible 
needs to be accounted for in terms of holding 
her responsible. And holding people respon-
sible is then taken to be essentially connected 
with having certain blame emotions toward 
them, such as resentment, indignation, and, in 
the case of holding oneself responsible, guilt.1 
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 Before discussing Strong Strawsonianism 
in detail, let me make two brief remarks. First, 
I will follow most authors in focusing on 
responsibility for unexcused, morally ques-
tionable actions. Thus I will not discuss moral 
responsibility for morally neutral or positive 
actions. Second, I will not discuss the nature 
of holding responsible. I will assume—fol-
lowing Wallace and others—that holding a 
person responsible for a morally questionable 
action is to have one of the blame emotions 
toward her or to judge that having one would 
be appropriate.
2. Introducing Strong 
Strawsonianism
 As the aim of Strong Strawsonianism is to 
account for what it is to be morally respon-
sible for questionable actions, I will begin 
with a quick pre- theoretical sketch of what 
it is that Strong Strawsonianism aims to il-
luminate. When we excuse a person for an 
objectionable action, we try to show that she 
is not morally responsible for it. In everyday 
life, we say things like “you did not intend to 
step on your neighbor’s foot,” “you did not 
want to do it,” “you did not know that you 
would do it,” “you could not have known that 
you would do it,” and so on. When we say 
these things, we are not trying to show that it 
was not you who stepped on her foot, or that 
it was not you who caused her pain. Thus we 
do not deny that you are causally responsible 
for what happened to her. Instead, what we 
are trying to show is that you are not mor-
ally responsible for stepping on her foot and 
causing her pain. A certain kind of control 
and a certain kind of knowledge seem to be 
necessary for being morally responsible for 
an objectionable action. Similarly, when we 
tell someone that the person who stepped on 
her foot is a young child, we are trying to 
make her see that no one is morally respon-
sible for what happened to her. Very young 
children seem to lack the abilities that are 
necessary for being morally responsible for 
objectionable actions.
 Moreover, our forgiving certain people 
presupposes that we believe that they are 
morally responsible for the action we forgive 
them for. This is one of the important differ-
ences between forgetting, suppressing, and 
re- evaluating on the one hand and forgiving 
on the other. When we forgive a person for a 
certain objectionable action, we do not stop 
thinking that she was morally responsible for 
it.
 Given this sketch of moral responsibility 
for objectionable actions, let me take a closer 
look at Wallace’s account in order to intro-
duce Strong Strawsonianism. He explicitly 
argues for what I call Weak Strawsonianism: 
a person s “is morally responsible (for action 
x) if and only if it would be appropriate to 
hold s morally responsible (for action x)” 
(Wallace 1994, p. 91). Even though theses 
about necessary and sufficient conditions do 
not say anything about metaphysical depen-
dency, Wallace claims that the left side of 
the biconditional depends on the right: he 
contends that “we must interpret the relevant 
[responsibility] facts as somehow dependent 
on our practices of holding people respon-
sible” (Wallace 1994, p. 89; emphasis added; 
see also p. 91). It is important that he takes 
this dependency to be a metaphysical relation, 
that is, a relation between the responsibility 
facts and certain facts about the practice of 
holding responsible.
 The claim that fact x depends on fact y is 
compatible with the claim that fact y depends 
on fact x. If both are true, then there is an 
interdependence relation between x and y. 
But Wallace does not seem to believe that 
facts about being responsible and facts about 
holding responsible are interdependent. He 
claims that moral responsibility “facts are 
fixed by the answer to the question of when 
it is appropriate to hold people responsible” 
(Wallace 1994, p. 93; emphasis added). The s__
n__
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notion of fixing suggests that facts about 
responsibility depend on those things that 
fix them, but these things do not depend on 
facts about responsibility. Thus the notion of 
fixing suggests an asymmetry.
 In the sentence just quoted, Wallace claims 
that the responsibility facts are fixed by “the 
answer” to the question of when it is ap-
propriate to hold people responsible. But he 
surely does not mean that whether or not a 
responsibility fact obtains depends on what 
we actually answer to that question, because 
our actual answers can be false. It is more 
plausible to interpret him as suggesting that 
the responsibility facts are fixed by the nor-
mative facts that make a certain answer to 
that question true. Thus Wallace can be in-
terpreted as claiming that responsibility facts 
are fixed by facts about when it is appropriate 
to hold people responsible.
 Claims about nothing more than necessary 
and sufficient conditions—such as Weak 
Strawsonianism—do not describe any meta-
physical dependency between the two sides of 
the biconditional. But, as I have just shown, 
Wallace can be plausibly interpreted as argu-
ing for a metaphysical, asymmetrical, depen-
dence relation between the appropriateness of 
holding a person responsible and her being 
responsible. Claims to the effect that there is a 
metaphysical, asymmetrical dependence rela-
tion between x and y are often understood as 
claims about the grounding relation between 
x and y.2 Such claims can be formulated as 
because, in- virtue- of, or making- the- case 
claims. The grounding relation is the one that 
philosophers often have in mind who claim 
that pious actions are loved by the gods be-
cause they are good, that the glass is fragile 
in virtue of its chemical micro- structure, or 
that the firing of Paul’s c- fibers makes it the 
case that Paul is in pain. I suggest that we 
understand Strong Strawsonianism as a claim 
of that sort: a person is morally responsible 
for a certain objectionable action if and only 
if and because it would be appropriate to hold 
her morally responsible for it.
 Claims about the grounds of moral re-
sponsibility are attempts to explain it in a 
non- causal way. If Strong Strawsonianism 
turns out to be true, and if we realize that this 
is so, then we know not only that facts about 
appropriately holding responsible always 
co- occur with responsibility facts; we also 
know that facts about appropriately holding 
a person responsible account for it being the 
case that that person is responsible. Then we 
know, as Kit Fine puts it, that there is “an 
explanatory or determinative connection—a 
movement, so to speak” (Fine 2012, p. 38; 
emphasis in original) from appropriately 
holding responsible to moral responsibility. 
This is an account of responsibility that is 
deeper than one that solely identifies neces-
sary and sufficient conditions.
 Strong Strawsonianism can be illustrated 
in the following way, in which each box is a 
fact and the arrow stands for the grounding 
relation between the facts:
It would be 
appropriate 
to hold s 
responsible 
for x
S is responsible 
for x
 This is Strong Strawsonianism’s central the-
sis about moral responsibility. Even though 
this claim is inspired by Wallace’s account of 
responsibility, it is not entirely clear that it is 
the view he accepts. Some passages can also 
be read as suggesting that a person’s being 
responsible for some action is identical with 
it being appropriate to hold her responsible 
for it.3 And this claim is incompatible with 
Strong Strawsonianism because the ground-
ing relation is different from the identity 
relation. The identity thesis is an interesting 
alternative to Strong Strawsonianism and to __s
__n
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the position that responsibility is more fun-
damental than the appropriateness of holding 
responsible. However, in what follows, I will 
leave this view, as well as exegetical questions 
about Wallace’s account aside. Instead, I will 
defend Strong Strawsonianism itself against 
four important objections.
3. The Naturally False Objection
 What I call the Naturally False Objection 
starts with the claim that it is “natural to think 
that responsibility facts are fixed by features 
of the agent and the agent’s action” (Vargas 
2004, p. 225). It is, for example, natural to 
think that what makes a person morally re-
sponsible for a morally questionable action 
is that she really performed that action, that 
she knew what she was doing, and that she 
had some kind of control over her thoughts 
and behavior. The objection then says that 
Strong Strawsonianism argues that responsi-
bility facts are fixed by facts about responses 
toward the agent, and not by facts about the 
agent herself and her action. Thus, one might 
conclude, it is natural to think that Strong 
Strawsonianism is false.4
 But once Strong Strawsonianism is under-
stood in the way I developed it in section 2, it 
becomes clear that this objection is based on 
a misunderstanding. Strong Strawsonianism 
says that the fact that it would be appropriate 
to hold a person morally responsible makes 
it the case that she is responsible. But this 
does not rule out the possibility that the fact 
that it would be appropriate to hold that per-
son responsible is grounded in further facts, 
including facts about the person and her 
actions. The only claim about the grounds 
of the appropriateness of holding a person 
responsible that Strong Strawsonianism rules 
out is that the responsibility of the person (is 
part of what) makes it the case that it would 
be appropriate to hold her responsible.
 Strong Strawsonianism is compatible, for 
example, with the claim that what makes it 
appropriate to hold a person responsible for 
some wrongdoing is that she really performed 
it, that she knew what she was doing, that 
she had the relevant sort of control over her 
thoughts and actions, and that it is appropriate 
to blame those agents who have these proper-
ties. Then the fact that it is appropriate to hold 
that person responsible for that wrongdoing 
makes it the case that she is morally respon-
sible for it. This idea can be illustrated in the 
following way, in which each box is a fact and 
the arrow stands for the grounding relation:
F
It would be 
appropriate 
to hold s 
responsible 




 Strong Strawsonianism only consists in the 
claim that the fact that the right box stands 
for is grounded in the fact that the middle 
box stands for. And this claim does not rule 
out that the fact that the middle box stands 
for obtains because of further facts f. It is 
not only possible, but also very plausible 
that certain facts about s and x will be part of 
those facts that make it appropriate to hold s 
responsible for x. And these facts about the 
agent and her action therefore play a crucial 
role in the explanation of the agent’s being 
morally responsible for that action. Moreover, 
if one assumes that the grounding relation 
is transitive, as many authors do, the Strong 
Strawsonian can even claim that f itself makes 
it the case that s is responsible for x.
 The opponents of Strong Strawsonianism 
will probably not be satisfied by this reply. 
They might claim that Strong Strawso-
nianism is still implausible because “in our 
common- sense moral ontology, the property 
of responsibility is not dependent on some 
further and more basic normative property” 
(Vargas 2004, p. 226).
 How can we find out what our common-
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approach is to take a closer look at our ev-
eryday moral practices and to ask whether 
participating in these practices commits us to 
certain ontological claims. If it turns out that 
we are committed to claims that are in conflict 
with Strong Strawsonianism, this would be a 
prima facie reason against this account. Let 
me focus on our practice of excusing agents.
 Strong Strawsonianism would conflict with 
the practice of excusing agents if claims like 
“she was not responsible for what she did and 
therefore it is inappropriate to blame her for 
it” were essential for that practice. In fact, our 
practice of excusing is neutral with regard to 
claims about the grounding relation between 
moral responsibility and the appropriateness 
of holding responsible. As I suggested above, 
we excuse people by saying things like “she 
did not intend to do it” or “she could not 
have known,” and these excuses fit nicely 
with Strong Strawsonianism. According to 
that view, such excuses are attempts to show 
that some of the facts that are essential parts 
of the explanation of moral responsibility do 
not obtain. Facts about what a person intends 
to do and about what she knows about her 
action ground, so the Strong Strawsonian 
argues, whether or not it would be appropri-
ate to blame her for that action. And if certain 
facts about what she intends and knows do not 
obtain such that it would be inappropriate to 
blame that person, then this explains why she 
is not morally responsible for that action. In 
this way, many of our everyday excuses are at-
tempts to explain why a person is not morally 
responsible for a questionable action. Thus 
Strong Strawsonianism is not in conflict with 
our everyday practice of excusing people.
 More generally, I do not see why our com-
mon sense should be in conflict with Strong 
Strawsonianism. Perhaps some people have 
that impression because they confuse claims 
about the grounds of responsibility with 
claims about the necessary conditions of re-
sponsibility. Strong Strawsonianism implies 
that being morally responsible is not among 
the grounds of being an appropriate object 
of blame. Some might think that it also im-
plies that being morally responsible is not a 
necessary condition of being an appropriate 
object of blame. And the latter claim is clearly 
counter- intuitive. However, Strong Strawso-
nianism explains why being morally respon-
sible is in fact a necessary condition of being 
an appropriate object of blame: it says that its 
being appropriate to blame a person makes 
it the case that she is responsible. Therefore, 
it is, according to that view, impossible for it 
to be appropriate to blame a person for an ac-
tion that she is not responsible for. To sum up 
this reply, I see no reason why our common 
sense should include the claim that moral 
responsibility (partly) grounds appropriate 
blame. And this is the only claim that would 
be in conflict with Strong Strawsonianism.
 An important upshot of this discussion is 
that what distinguishes Strong Strawsonian-
ism from other accounts of the nature of 
responsibility is not a claim about which facts 
are metaphysically most fundamental. The 
distinctive feature of Strong Strawsonian-
ism is a claim about the immediate ground 
of moral responsibility. It says that the ap-
propriateness of certain responses is the 
immediate ground of the property of being 
morally responsible. And this is compatible 
with the claim that the appropriateness of 
these responses has other grounds, including 
facts about the agent and her action.
4. The Not- Interesting Objection
 Once it becomes clear that Strong Straw-
sonianism is not a claim about the ultimate 
grounds of responsibility, it may be argued 
that Strong Strawsonianism is not interesting. 
For, it might be said, what we really want to 
know when we discuss the nature of moral 
responsibility is what its ultimate grounds are.
 However, it is simply not true that what 
we are really interested in when we discuss 
the nature of moral responsibility is its ulti-
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interested in other questions is that most cur-
rent accounts of the nature of responsibility 
should not be understood as aiming to identify 
the ultimate grounds of moral responsibility. 
Take the claim that a person is responsible for 
some action if and only if and because she 
had a certain kind of control c over it (such as 
being moderately reason- responsive) and she 
had knowledge k (such as knowing all relevant 
normative and non- normative facts about the 
action and its consequences). This would only 
be an account of the ultimate grounds of moral 
responsibility if c and k are not grounded in 
other facts. But it is quite plausible that one’s 
having a certain kind of control over one’s 
action and one’s knowing something are psy-
chological facts at least in part. And it is also 
quite plausible that psychological facts are at 
least partly grounded in other facts, such as 
facts about one’s brain. Assuming this, claim-
ing that a person is responsible because of her 
c and k is not to suggest that c and k are the 
ultimate grounds of her moral responsibility. 
But it is, surely, very interesting whether or 
not one’s responsibility really is grounded in 
c and k. Thus what we are interested in when 
we discuss the nature of moral responsibility 
is not only its ultimate grounds. It is interest-
ing to identify the grounds of responsibility 
at very different levels.
 One might agree that we are not only in-
terested in the ultimate grounds of responsi-
bility and still contend that the level Strong 
Strawsonianism is focusing on, that is, the 
immediate ground of moral responsibility, is 
not interesting. Because what we are really 
interested in when we discuss the nature of 
moral responsibility, one might claim, is the 
compatibility question of whether we can be 
morally responsible in a deterministic world. 
And Strong Strawsonianism does not, the 
objection goes, help to answer that question.
 It is true that Strong Strawsonianism is neu-
tral with regard to the compatibility question. 
But it is not true that we are only interested in 
the grounds of moral responsibility insofar as 
they are directly related to the compatibility 
debate. The question “who is responsible for 
what?” is important for our everyday lives. A 
better understanding of the nature of moral 
responsibility would help to answer that 
question or, at least, to understand what we 
want to know when we ask it. Therefore, the 
nature of moral responsibility is an interest-
ing topic independent of concerns about the 
consequences of determinism. Moreover, if 
there is a good account of responsibility that 
compatibilists and incompatibilists can agree 
on, then this may also help to frame the dis-
cussion between these two camps. Thus the 
neutrality of Strong Strawsonianism can even 
be seen as a theoretical advantage (see, e.g., 
McKenna 2012, for an account of the nature 
of responsibility that is intended to be neutral 
with regard to the compatibility question).
 Finally, Strong Strawsonianism implies 
an interesting partial answer to an important 
question: What are the non- normative facts 
that make it the case that it is appropriate to 
hold an agent responsible for some bad ac-
tion? Strong Strawsonianism narrows down 
the possible replies in a remarkable way. It 
says that whatever the facts are that make it 
the case that an agent is an appropriate target 
of blame for some action, the fact that she is 
morally responsible for it is not among them.
 To sum up, Strong Strawsonianism is an in-
teresting account of the nature of responsibil-
ity. It does not offer an ultimate explanation of 
responsibility, and it is neutral with regard to 
the compatibility question. But it is a theory of 
an important part of the metaphysical structure 
that constitutes moral responsibility. It would 
be interesting to know whether it is true.
5. The Reductio Objection
 The Reductio Objection focuses on the no-
tion of appropriateness. Usually this objection 
is presented against Weak Strawsonianism, 
but if the objection is successful, then it also 
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 Wallace claims that the appropriateness at 
the heart of Strawsonianism should be un-
derstood as a moral one. More precisely, he 
argues that a person’s being responsible de-
pends on it being fair to hold her responsible. 
But critics, such as Angela Smith (2007), 
argue that whether or not it is fair to hold a 
person responsible does not only depend on 
features that seem intuitively relevant for that 
person’s responsibility. For example, it seems 
unfair for a person to hold another person 
responsible for some wrongdoing if the latter 
already seriously regrets what she did. Or it 
seems unfair for a person to blame another 
for a crime if the former has done exactly the 
same thing. Now the moral version of Strong 
Strawsonianism seems to say that its not be-
ing fair to hold a person responsible makes it 
the case that she is not responsible. But this 
is just absurd in these scenarios. The agents 
may very well be responsible for what they 
did even though it is not fair for certain people 
to hold them responsible.
 There have been some promising attempts 
to reply to the Reductio Objection that I will 
not discuss here (see Maher 2010; McKenna 
2012, chap. 2). Instead, I will sketch two more 
ways in which the proponent of Strong Straw-
sonianism could reply. First, the version of 
Strong Strawsonianism I presented in section 
2 does not need to insist that the appropriate-
ness at issue is a moral one. Alternatively, 
the Strong Strawsonian could argue that the 
appropriateness should be understood in non- 
moral terms. Many theories of emotions say 
that emotions have a representational dimen-
sion. Part of what it is to, say, fear something 
is to represent that something as dangerous. 
The representational dimension of an emotion 
makes room for a non- moral, representational 
evaluation of an emotion (see, e.g., D’Arms 
and Jacobson 2000; Graham 2014). Being 
afraid of a dog is correct or fitting if the dog is 
dangerous and it is incorrect or unfitting if the 
dog is not dangerous. Thus emotions, includ-
ing the blame emotions, can be appropriate in 
the sense of being representationally correct, 
and they can be inappropriate in the sense of 
being representationally incorrect. Now, the 
Strong Strawsonian could argue that a person 
is morally responsible for something if and 
only if and because it would be correct to have 
the blame emotions toward her. Then one 
could describe the cases sketched above in the 
following way: even though it may be unfair 
for a certain person to blame someone who 
regrets what she did, it may nonetheless be 
representationally correct to have one of the 
blame emotions toward her. As this grounds 
responsibility, it follows that the agent really 
is morally responsible for what she did.
 Second, the interpretation of appropriate-
ness in terms of correctness can also be the 
basis for defending the view that the appropri-
ateness at the heart of Strong Strawsonianism 
is a moral one. The first step toward such 
a defense would be to distinguish between 
different notions or kinds of desert. Then 
one would have to identify the kind of desert 
that is necessarily connected with the account 
of correctness or fittingness I just sketched. 
According to this sense of desert, a person 
deserves to be blamed if and only if it would 
be correct to have the blame emotions toward 
her (see, e.g., King 2012, 2014; Clarke 2013). 
Finally, one would have to show that this no-
tion of desert is a moral notion, just like the 
notion of fairness. It seems quite plausible 
that there is such a notion of desert, and this 
notion seems to be in play when we say that 
a person deserves gratitude for helping us, 
compassion for her suffering, or honor for 
her success. If having one of these attitudes 
toward a person is fitting, then the person 
seems to deserve (in a certain sense) to be 
the object of these attitudes.
 If there is such a notion of desert, then the 
Strong Strawsonian can say that it may be 
unfair for a person to blame a wrongdoer who 
seriously regrets what she did, but she none-
theless deserves (in that sense) to be blamed 
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that a person’s deserving (in that sense) to be 
blamed for an action makes it the case that 
she is morally responsible for it.
 This is not the place to analyze these no-
tions of desert and correctness or fittingness 
in detail. But I have shown that there are plau-
sible ways to reply to the Reductio- Objection.
6. Why Strong Strawsonianism?
 I have presented Strong Strawsonianism, 
and I have defended it against three pressing 
objections. But are there positive reasons to 
accept it? The opponent might still claim 
that it is natural to believe that being mor-
ally responsible is metaphysically more 
fundamental than being appropriately held 
responsible. And she might contend that the 
Strong Strawsonian bears the burden of proof: 
as long as there is no positive reason to adopt 
that view, she could say, we can simply leave 
it aside as a—curiously enough—not- yet- 
refuted but somehow counterintuitive account 
of moral responsibility. What can the Strong 
Strawsonian reply to that final objection?
 First, the Strong Strawsonian should reply 
that the preceding discussion suggests that 
claiming that responsibility grounds appro-
priate blame is not as natural as her opponent 
seems to think. There is no obvious positive 
reason for accepting this account, and there is 
an interesting and defensible alternative to it. 
This is, admittedly, not a positive reason for 
Strong Strawsonianism, but it undermines the 
apparent certainty that responsibility grounds 
appropriate blame.
 Second, Strong Strawsonianism elegantly 
captures and illuminates an idea that many 
authors find attractive. This is the idea that 
responsibility comes into the world because 
of some facts about the moral community 
and its practice. An agent is not only morally 
responsible, the thought goes, because she 
has certain mental properties; she also has to 
be integrated in a moral community and its 
practice in a specific way.
 Now, the opponent of Strong Strawsonian-
ism might simply reject that a theory of moral 
responsibility should be able to account for 
that idea. And this is not the place to argue 
that an account of moral responsibility that 
cannot make sense of it is, therefore, inaccu-
rate. However, many authors find that picture 
compelling (see, e.g., Strawson 1962/2003; 
Watson 1987/2004; Darwall 2006; McKenna 
2012). And for them, Strong Strawsonianism 
is a natural option. Take Wallace again. He 
believes that the opponent account that re-
sponsibility facts are more fundamental than 
facts about appropriately holding responsible 
is committed to there being a “realm of moral 
responsibility facts, inhering in the fabric of 
the world completely independently of our 
activities and interests in holding people re-
sponsible” (Wallace 1994, p. 88). However, 
he believes that there are no such facts: “My 
worry . . . is that I cannot see how to make 
sense of the idea of a prior and independent 
realm of moral responsibility facts” (Wal-
lace 1994, p. 88). His alternative is that an 
agent’s being morally responsible for some 
action is fixed by facts about her being part 
of a moral community and by facts about the 
community’s practice.
 Strong Strawsonianism spells out this idea 
in a plausible way. It does not say that facts 
about our actual practice make it the case that 
an agent is responsible because our actual 
practice can be misguided. It says that wheth-
er or not an agent is responsible is grounded 
in normative facts that would ideally guide 
our practice. An agent is responsible for some 
bad action, the account says, because it would 
be appropriate for others to interrelate with 
her in a certain way, namely by holding her 
morally responsible for that action. Thus what 
speaks in favor of Strong Strawsonianism is 
that it captures and illuminates an idea about 
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1. In this paper, I will only be concerned with moral responsibility as accountability. For the distinc-
tion between accountability and other notions or kinds of responsibility, see, for example, Watson 
(1996/2004), Shoemaker (2011), and Fischer and Tognazzini (2011).
2. For the notion of grounding, see, for example, Rosen (2010), Fine (2012), and the other chapters in 
Correia and Schnieder (2012). There is a debate about whether or not the grounding relation is transi-
tive; see, for example, Schaffer (2012). The version of Strong Strawsonianism that I will defend does 
not depend on whether this is so.
3. Compare the claim that “facts [about whether people are morally responsible for what they do] 
can be interpreted as facts about whether it would be appropriate to hold people morally responsible” 
(Wallace 1994, p. 91). One could argue for such an identity thesis by claiming that it is hard to charac-
terize a person’s being morally responsible for a bad action (in the sense of accountability) without at 
the same time characterizing her as being an appropriate target of blame for that action. This might be 
taken to suggest that these are the same properties. Examining the prospects of this line of reasoning 
is the aim of another paper.
4. Similarly, McKenna argues that Wallace’s account has difficulty dealing with the fact that our 
”norms and practices of holding responsible are sensitive to facts about agency that help settle whether 
an agent is equipped for being responsible. Often, our norms and practices bend to the nature of the 
agent, not vice versa” (McKenna 2012, p. 50). The following reply to the Naturally False Objection is 
also intended to work against this objection.
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